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Abstract
The Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center’s Division of Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response
System (AFHSC-GEIS) supports and oversees surveillance for emerging infectious diseases, including respiratory
diseases, of importance to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). AFHSC-GEIS accomplishes this mission by
providing funding and oversight to a global network of partners for respiratory disease surveillance. This report
details the system’s surveillance activities during 2009, with a focus on efforts in responding to the novel H1N1
Influenza A (A/H1N1) pandemic and contributions to global public health. Active surveillance networks established
by AFHSC-GEIS partners resulted in the initial detection of novel A/H1N1 influenza in the U.S. and several other
countries, and viruses isolated from these activities were used as seed strains for the 2009 pandemic influenza
vaccine. Partners also provided diagnostic laboratory training and capacity building to host nations to assist with
the novel A/H1N1 pandemic global response, adapted a Food and Drug Administration-approved assay for use on
a ruggedized polymerase chain reaction platform for diagnosing novel A/H1N1 in remote settings, and provided
estimates of seasonal vaccine effectiveness against novel A/H1N1 illness. Regular reporting of the system’s
worldwide surveillance findings to the global public health community enabled leaders to make informed
decisions on disease mitigation measures and controls for the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic. AFHSC-GEIS’s
support of a global network contributes to DoD’s force health protection, while supporting global public health.
Background
In response to the 1996 Presidential Directive (NSTC-7),
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) established the
Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response
System (DoD-GEIS) in 1997, with the mission to moni-
tor newly emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases
(EIDs) among U.S. servicemembers and dependent
populations [1]. Comparable to their global burden
of disease, respiratory infections are responsible for
25 percent to 30 percent of both outpatient illness and
hospitalizations among U.S. military personnel [2,3].
Influenza and adenovirus infections are among the etiol-
ogies that greatly contribute to morbidity and mortality
in military members [4]. During the 1918 influenza pan-
demic, the U.S. military experienced attack rates as high
as 25 percent and case fatality rates averaging 5 percent
(ranging from 1 percent to 8 percent) [5].
DoD-GEIS, a division of the Armed Forces Health Sur-
veillance Center (AFHSC) since early 2008, centralized the
coordination of DoD influenza and other respiratory dis-
ease surveillance efforts beginning in 1998. The program
was expanded with 2006 congressional supplementary
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has maintained this effort. Today, AFHSC-GEIS provides
direction, funding and oversight to a system that consists
of a network of global partners, including approximately
500 sites in 70 countries (Figure 1).
During the past four years (2006-2009), the AFHSC-
GEIS influenza surveillance system increased support for
avian and pandemic influenza preparedness to include
activities in surveillance and response to newly identified
strains and pandemics, such as H5N1 and the 2009
novel A/H1N1. By supporting global surveillance and
directing response efforts, DoD serves as a sentinel for
local epidemics and can assist in limiting disease trans-
mission. An immediate focus of DoD is decreasing the
impact of the novel A/H1N1 pandemic on the armed
forces, including reducing recruit- and other training-
associated illnesses and deaths, and controlling second-
ary viral and bacterial associated morbidity. These
efforts are similar in intent to those undertaken at the
time of the appearance of the new virus strain during
the 1918 H1N1 pandemic when efforts were also made
to reduce the impact of the virus on the military during
World War I.
The AFHSC-GEIS influenza surveillance system plays
a major role in the U.S. government’s( U S G )c o n t r i b u -
tions to the global surveillance of influenza viruses and
contributes to the World Health Organization’s( W H O )
Global Influenza Surveillance Network [9]. Core compo-
nents of the AFHSC-GEIS influenza surveillance system
are a network of specialized diagnostic and reference
laboratories in the continental United States, medical
treatment facilities within the Military Health System,
and five DoD overseas laboratories, along with their
respective detachments. The system, built around net-
works of hub and satellite laboratories, comprises many
joint ventures with host countries.
This article focuses on the 2009 activities and accom-
plishments of the AFHSC-GEIS laboratory-based net-
work regarding global surveillance for respiratory
diseases and responding to the novel A/H1N1 influenza
pandemic. These activities are described relative to, and
by means of, AFHSC-GEIS strategic goals: surveillance
Figure 1 AFHSC-GEIS global influenza surveillance presence worldwide, as of May 2009.
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innovation and integration; and assessment and commu-
nication of value added.
2009 contributions
Surveillance and response
During April 2009, the first two U.S. cases of novel
A/H1N1 were detected in two separate Naval Health
Research Center (NHRC) surveillance projects sup-
ported by AFHSC-GEIS. In the first instance, NHRC
investigators collected a specimen from a 10-year-old
DoD dependent who had enrolled in a biomedical trial
to test a new influenza diagnostic platform conducted at
the Naval Medical Center, San Diego, Calif. Initial
results by an external reference laboratory suggested an
influenza A/untypable virus [10,11]. At the same time, a
9-year-old female from the U.S./Mexico border was
sampled in a collaborative surveillance study with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC)
Border Infectious Disease Surveillance Project. NHRC
determined infection from an influenza A/untyped virus.
Further testing on the IBIS T5000 platform, which infers
H and N types from multiple genomic signatures, indi-
cated an influenza A/swine/H1 virus. Samples from
both patients were shipped to the CDC for confirmation
and characterization.
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Air Force School of Aero-
space Medicine (USAFSAM) detected two near simulta-
neous cases among military dependents in the San
Antonio area. The WHO used three of the strains (A/
California/7/2009, A/California/4/2009 and A/Texas/5/
2009) as potential strains for the 2009 pandemic influ-
enza vaccine. A/California/7/2009 was eventually
selected as the seed strain [9].
In addition to detecting several of the initial cases of
novel A/H1N1 within the U.S., AFHSC-GEIS partner
laboratories were instrumental in monitoring the global
spread of the virus. The Armed Forces Research Institute
of the Medical Sciences (AFRIMS) laboratory was the
first to detect novel A/H1N1 virus in Nepal and Bhutan,
while the Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2 (NAMRU-2)
provided support for the initial confirmation on novel
A/H1N1 in Cambodia and Lao People’sD e m o c r a t i c
Republic. The U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Kenya
(USAMRU-K), another AFHSC-GEIS partner, supported
initial laboratory confirmation for Kenya and the Republic
of Seychelles, and the Naval Medical Research Center
Detachment (NMRCD) identified the first cases in Peru
and supported initial confirmation in Colombia and Ecua-
dor. Additionally, NHRC diagnosed the first infection in
Guam/Micronesia, and the Naval Medical Research Unit
No. 3 (NAMRU-3) not only identified the first cases
in Kuwait, but also confirmed outbreaks in Afghanistan,
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt and Lebanon.
Results of AFHSC-GEIS-sponsored influenza surveil-
lance sample testing were reported via host-nation colla-
borators to their respective ministries to ensure the
ministries could make informed and timely decisions
about influenza control. The AFHSC-GEIS network sur-
veillance support of the 2009 influenza pandemic was
instrumental in the timely tracking and monitoring of
the virus. In recognition of AFHSC-GEIS support, the
AFRIMS field laboratory in Cebu was made an official
Philippine Department of Health testing laboratory,
Public Health Command Region-South (PHCR-South)
assisted the Guatemalan Ministry of Health Influenza
laboratory in becoming a National Influenza Center
(NIC), and the Peruvian Instituto Nacional de Salud
(National Institute of Health) awarded a commendation
medal to NMRCD for its support in the pandemic
response.
In addition to the novel A/H1N1 pandemic support
provided to foreign host nations, AFHSC-GEIS network
partners continued to support influenza and respiratory
disease surveillance among military recruits, active-duty
servicemembers, and U.S. military beneficiaries. AFHSC-
GEIS supported the timely surveillance and rapid diag-
nosis of circulating influenza and other respiratory
viruses within our overseas military populations through
its partners in Europe (PHCR-Europe and Landstuhl
Regional Medical Center (LRMC)), Japan (PHCR-Pacific
and Naval Hospital Yokosuka), and the Republic of
Korea (Brian Allgood Army Community Hospital
(BAACH)).
Although many network laboratories, such as LRMC
and BAACH, could not confirm a novel A/H1N1 infec-
tion during the initial months of the pandemic, the facil-
ities provided a strong presumptive diagnosis of novel
A/H1N1 based on their findings of untypable influenza
A infections. With AFHSC-GEIS support, BAACH
became one of the first U.S. overseas laboratories cap-
able of providing on-site diagnosis of novel A/H1N1 for
U.S. military personnel and their families. Likewise, the
ability of the Navy Environmental Preventive Medicine
U n i tN o .2 ,i nc o l l a b o r a t i o nw i t hN A M R U - 3 ,t os t a n d
up a novel A/H1N1 testing site in Kuwait on short
notice also helped provide a timely diagnosis for
deployed clinicians. In turn, this effort helped ease ten-
sions between the U.S. military and host countries in
Southwest Asia and the Middle East by allowing the
rapid identification and subsequent isolation of infected
individuals to reduce the likelihood of transmitting
influenza virus to local civilians.
A significant challenge for AFHSC-GEIS partners in
2009 was the need to balance their novel A/H1N1 pan-
demic response with their ability to continue surveil-
lance efforts for other influenza viruses and respiratory
diseases (e.g., adenovirus), including potential zoonotic
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the H5N1 and 2009 novel A/H1N1 viruses [12]. In
2009, AFRIMS and NAMRU-2 scientists, in collabora-
tion with the University of Iowa’sC e n t e rf o rE m e r g i n g
Infectious Diseases, further strengthened important
research of the human-animal interface and epidemiol-
ogy of influenza viruses by expanding established
cohort-based studies and creating new ones in five
countries (Cambodia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Romania and
Thailand). The endeavor allowed researchers to examine
risk factors and transmission patterns of influenza at the
human-animal interface.
Likewise, USAMRU-K initiated similar surveillance
work in Uganda and continued to conduct migratory
bird surveillance to monitor and track the spread of
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). NMRCD con-
ducted similar migratory bird surveillance in Peru. In
conjunction with the CDC, NAMRU-3 and NMRCD
initiated population-based, influenza-like illness and
severe acute respiratory illness surveillance efforts
among hospital and community cohorts in Egypt and
Peru, respectively (Figure 2).
Finally, AFHSC-GEIS partners provided laboratory
diagnosis for 37 of the 52 (71 percent) reported cases
of human H5N1 infection worldwide in 2009 [3].
NAMRU-3, serving as the WHO’s Eastern Mediterra-
nean Regional Influenza Reference Center (EMRO),
provided laboratory diagnosis for 36 of 38 (95 percent)
of reported cases of human H5N1 infection in
Egypt, and NAMRU-2 identified an additional case in
Cambodia [13].
Training and capacity building
Although these initiatives are more fully addressed in
other articles within this supplement, the strategic goal
of training and capacity building was a significant focus
of AFHSC-GEIS influenza funding [14,15]. Nearly all
AFHSC-GEIS partners assisted with training and capa-
city building programs. While the primary objective of
these programs is to develop and strengthen global sur-
veillance capacity, the endeavors have the added benefit
of improving USG civil-military and military-military
relations with host nations. AFHSC-GEIS provided
funding to the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian
Assistance Medicine at the Uniformed Services Univer-
sity to conduct 14 training sessions for 36 countries.
A total of 885 individuals attended the training in sup-
port of U.S. Combatant Command partnerships with
priority nations.
AFHSC-GEIS funding also supported the Kenyan
NIC designation in late 2009 as the WHO East Africa
regional influenza laboratory through the assistance
of USAMRU-K. Within three months of the novel
A/H1N1 virus introduction into the region, the Kenyan
NIC received and tested over 1,500 influenza samples
from Kenya, Republic of Seychelles and Somalia (Addi-
tional File 1). While serving as the WHO’s EMRO refer-
ence laboratory, NAMRU-3 supported the development
of NICs in Afghanistan, Iraq and Jordan, and the sus-
tainment of NICs in Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan,
Sudan and Syria. In response to the 2009 influenza pan-
demic, NAMRU-3 also worked closely with the WHO
to train over 70 participants from 32 countries in
North/West Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East
on real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain
reaction (rRT-PCR) using the CDC H1N1 assay kits.
In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, initial cases of
A/H1N1 were tested at the National Center for Labora-
tory and Epidemiology using equipment and supplies
furnished by NAMRU-2 and AFHSC-GEIS funding. All
of these efforts helped strengthen the global public
health community.
Research, innovation and integration
One of the primary focus areas within the strategic goal
of research, innovation and integration is the develop-
ment of rapidly deployable, field-expedient diagnostic
platforms for influenza. Although they generally have a
high specificity, point-of-care tests have a poor sensitiv-
ity for influenza, especially the 2009 novel A/H1N1
virus [16]. Moreover, while these tests can distinguish
between influenza A and B viruses, they are rarely able
to subtype specific viruses.
During 2009, AFHSC-GEIS supported the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) and the Chemical Biological Medical Sys-
tems-Joint Program Management Office transition of
the CDC H5N1 and novel H1N1 assays to the Joint Bio-
logical Agent Identification and Diagnostic System
(JBAIDS). The system had been developed as a rugge-
dized PCR platform for field identification of priority
pathogens of interest. During 2009, USAMRIID success-
fully optimized and tested the CDC H5N1 assays, and
the data will be used in a DoD-sponsored 510K applica-
tion to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for
use on the JBAIDS in the future.
In addition, USAMRIID and NHRC successfully
optimized the CDC H1N1 assay for use on the
JBAIDS platform, and DoD submitted a request to the
FDA to extend the current H1N1 Emergency Use
Authorization for the JBAIDS H1N1 pandemic influ-
enza assay. The FDA commissioner signed the request
on Aug. 24, 2009. As a result, DoD now has the cap-
ability to provide a timely clinical diagnosis of novel
A/H1N1 in U.S. servicemembers and civilians in
deployed and field settings, and is well positioned to
extend this capability to include H5N1 influenza diag-
nosis (Additional File 2).
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also supported FDA approval of a rapid avian H5N1
influenza test (Arbor Vita Corp., AVantage™)u s i n g
NHRC clinical trial data and validation of the National
Veterinary Service Laboratory assay for the AI matrix,
H5N1 and H7N3 strains on the JBAIDS by the DoD
Veterinary Food Analysis and Diagnostic Laboratory at
Fort Sam Houston, Texas. These capabilities will help to
further increase DoD’s capacity for HPAI surveillance
and outbreak response in remote settings.
In 2009, AFHSC-GEIS also sought to integrate influ-
enza full genome sequencing within DoD. To this end,
the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)
established full-length and ultra-deep, high-throughput
genome sequencing. Twenty-six viruses (two seasonal
A/H1N1, two A/H3N2, and 22 novel A/H1N1) from six
Legend
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Figure 2 Naval Medical Research Center Detachment influenza surveillance activities in Peru during 2009.
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Bank. In turn, this sequencing provided valuable infor-
mation on current viral mutations to DoD and the
global public health community.
Assessment and communication of value added
By utilizing data from the Defense Medical Surveillance
System, AFHSC conducts assessments on influenza activ-
ity, safety of the novel A/H1N1 influenza vaccine and
effectiveness of influenza vaccine. Influenza activity among
all DoD beneficiaries is monitored weekly and summarized
in a weekly report disseminated to service-specific public
health centers, preventive medicine physicians and DoD
leadership. In addition, AFHSC-GEIS generates a weekly
summary of all influenza surveillance reports from DoD
laboratories, service-specific public health centers, Comba-
tant Commands and other AFHSC-GEIS partners. The
weekly report is posted on the DoD Pandemic Influenza
Watchboard (http://fhpr.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/). Both
reports are valuable in providing DoD decision makers
and global public health leaders with a timely and succinct
accounting of influenza activity, severity and geographic
distribution.
AFHSC has also partnered with the Military Vaccine
Agency, CDC and FDA to provide weekly safety assess-
ments of the novel A/H1N1 influenza vaccine among
active component servicemembers. AFHSC provides the
only data within DoD for this collaboration. As a result,
the center plays a valuable role in the country’s assess-
ment of the safety of this vaccine.
Each year, AFHSC-GEIS conducts mid-season assess-
ments of the effectiveness of the seasonal vaccines, and
during 2010, will examine the effectiveness of the novel
A/H1N1 influenza vaccine. Initial estimates of seasonal
vaccine effectiveness against novel A/H1N1-associated
illness have been presented at scientific meetings and
have been published. [17] Mid-season evaluations gener-
ated in January and February 2010 aimed to provide
crucial information to the Vaccine and Related Biologic
Products Advisory Committee and the public health
community at large.
Additionally, network partners at NHRC and USAF-
SAM also evaluate vaccine effectiveness among impor-
tant subpopulations throughout DoD. NHRC has
established a framework for evaluating influenza vaccine
effectiveness among basic military trainees that has
served as a valuable tool in the larger effort to monitor
this important indicator. USAFSAM works diligently
each season to identify and molecularly analyze viruses
from cases considered potential vaccine breakthroughs
(e.g., cases occurring ≥14 days after vaccination) as
determined by the surveillance questionnaire data col-
lected as part of routine sentinel surveillance. The
Defense Department is well positioned to determine the
overall effectiveness of both seasonal and pandemic vac-
cines in military populations. However, results of these
evaluations may not be generalizable to the population
at large, given the young, healthy and highly vaccinated
nature of military populations. This function is viewed
favorably and of great value to the vaccine and public
health communities.
Discussion
Although many goals were accomplished during this
past year, the novel A/H1N1 influenza virus pandemic
of 2009 presented unique management challenges for
AFHSC-GEIS and its network of partners. The first sig-
nificant problem centered on “sensitivity” in terms of
reporting cases to host-country health authorities, while
simultaneously providing U.S. military and civilian
health agencies with the reports. Although the identifi-
cation of cases was important, many host-country offi-
cials perceived that reporting of cases could be
detrimental to their economy or community. In tandem
with the high visibility of reports, laboratory testing
associated with the large increase in processing speci-
mens presented a challenge in terms of local and regio-
nal expectation of timely results that each partner
needed to address. The consolidation of testing results
was found to be challenging, thus, the authors see a
pressing need for standardization of reporting in the
future. Other challenges occurred in terms of achieving
effective ongoing strain-sequencing analysis and report-
ing to CDC and WHO officials. Lastly, given the high
volume of testing required during a pandemic, the pro-
gram must take a closer look at changing the paradigm
of testing whereby only a representative portion (i.e.,
10 percent to 20 percent), instead of every sample, is
given priority. For example, researchers could test severe
cases (e.g., SARI, hospitalized, pneumonia) to more
effectively provide reliable estimates of the virus’ impact.
A primary focus of the AFHSC-GEIS influenza surveil-
lance system in 2010 is the continued monitoring and
tracking of novel A/H1N1 virus for changes in severity,
antiviral resistance or transmissibility, particularly in our
special populations (e.g., recruits, deployed and ship-
board personnel) within the military. Sentinel-based sur-
veillance by our partners (e.g., USAFSAM, LRMC,
BAACH) will continue to remain a key component of
the surveillance program, as will the population-based
surveillance at eight of 10 military recruit-training cen-
ters and the Pacific Rim Surveillance at Naval Hospital
Yokosuka by NHRC.
To expand DoD’s surveillance efforts within the Mili-
tary Health System, AFHSC-GEIS is partnering with the
Infectious Disease Clinical Research Program to estab-
lish an acute respiratory infection consortium at several
large DoD medical treatment facilities. This group will
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health care population and evaluate the effectiveness of
potential intervention measures, including vaccine-speci-
fic effectiveness and non-vaccine interventions, such as
hand washing, febrile screening, cohorting and recruit
space allocation.
Besides continued surveillance within DoD, AFHSC-
GEIS partners are fostering and developing new
relationships for surveillance within other military popu-
lations to expand the center’s global surveillance pro-
gram and enhance its contribution to global public
health. Examples of potential future collaborations
include NMRCD partnerships with Bolivia and Ecuador;
AFRIMS surveillance in Vietnam; NAMRU-3 develop-
ment of a veterinary and human influenza surveillance
network in western Africa with Burkina Faso, Cote
d’Ivoire and Ghana armed forces; establishment of a
central African military alliance by the Global Viral
Forecasting Initiative in Cameroon; and expansion of
DoD and foreign military influenza and EID surveillance
efforts in East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) and
Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala and Hon-
duras). Further expansion of AFHSC-GEIS-sponsored
partnerships with Ministries of Health will also be
explored (e.g., by PHCR-South in Central America) to
provide improved surveillance in regions of the world
where surveillance is lacking or inadequate.
Surveillance of zoonotic influenza will become more
focused in 2010. While waterfowl, especially ducks and
geese, can be infected and shed many subtypes of influ-
enza A viruses, viral presence in these species does not
necessarily imply a risk to humans due to the potential
for species-specific strains and especially a lack of
human exposure to the waterfowl necessary for trans-
mission [18]. As a result, instead of focusing on migra-
tory birds, AFHSC-GEIS will concentrate on those
areas, such as live-bird markets, abattoirs and large
breeding farms, and occupations, such as backyard agri-
cultural workers, where individuals are more likely to be
exposed to animals, thus selecting a subset that is at
much higher risk of infection with, and transmission of,
zoonotic influenza strains.
Finally, AFHSC-GEIS will seek to expand DoD’sc a p -
ability to analyze and characterize viruses in-house. In
2009, AFHSC-GEIS funding was used to equip several
laboratories with antiviral resistance testing capacity
(genotypically by pyrosequencing and phenotypically by
inhibition in culture). The capability will be further
developed in the future. Likewise, WRAIR’sg e n o m i c
sequencing capacity and throughput will also increase.
Additionally, funding will be provided to expand the
JBAIDS influenza capability from novel A/H1N1 and
H5N1 to include pan-influenza A, pan-influenza B, H1
seasonal and H3 seasonal viruses.
Conclusions
The 1996 Presidential Directive charged the U.S. DoD with
monitoring EIDs in the military population. The directive
led to creation of the AFHSC-GEIS influenza surveillance
system, which strives to be a valuable asset to DoD and the
global public health community. Its specimen catchment
area includes regions noted for their regular contribution
to global strain circulation, such as Southeast Asia, as well
as South America, Africa and the Middle East, where strain
circulation information is limited.
During 2009, the AFHSC-GEIS influenza and respira-
tory disease surveillance network not only detected the
first cases of novel A/H1N1 among U.S. military benefi-
ciaries, but also detected the first laboratory-confirmed
cases within the United States and many countries
throughout the world [19]. In addition to its EID sur-
veillance, the network also assisted with providing a
rapid global response to the 2009 influenza pandemic
through training and capacity-building efforts with part-
ner nations, developing new surveillance and diagnostic
platforms, and timely reporting of surveillance results
and disease trends to public health authorities such as
the CDC and WHO.
This extensive network is positioned to detect the
emergence of new respiratory pathogens or significant
mutations in the novel A/H1N1 2009 influenza virus as
they transpire. The projects and initiatives in 2010 and
beyond will help to further strengthen and maintain
this network, and ultimately contribute to the sustain-
ment of force health protection and global public
health.
Additional File 1: AFHSC-GEIS supports pandemic H1N1 influenza
outbreak response in Kenya and East Africa. Figure - Laboratory-
confirmed cases of novel A/H1N1 influenza in Kenya, as of Oct. 8,
2009.
Additional File 2: Deployment of the JBAIDS for diagnosis of novel
A/H1N1 influenza in the deployed operations. Figure - Use of the
JBAIDS for diagnosis of the novel A/H1N1 influenza virus in a
deployed setting.
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